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The*purpose*this*study is to determine the effect of company size, systematic risk and 
independent commissioners on intellectual capital disclosure in banking companies listed 
on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. The dependent variable is disclosure of intellectual 
capital, while the independent variable is company size, systematic risk and independent 
commissioners .This riset was conducted on banking companie listd on the 
Indonesia*Stock Exchange* (IDX) by accesing secondary data on annual reports for the 
*2015-*2018 period. The results of the sample selection were 35 banking companies. The 
sample method used in this study is to use no-probability sample method with the sample 
technique* chosen is purposive sample. The analysis used in this research is panel data 
regression analysis. The partial evaluation hypothesis testing results show that firm size 
and systematic risk have a significant positif effect on intellectual capital disclosure, 
while independent commissioners do not have a significant negatif effect on intellectual 
capital *disclosure/ 
 




Public companies are required to 
make annual reports that have been 
audited by an independent public 
accounting office as very important 
information for investors on the basis 
of consideration of investment 
decisions. In the current era of 
globalization, business people realize 
that business competition 
*lies*no*only* in ownership of 
tangibility*assets, but rather in 
creation, information syste, 
organizational management, and 
organizational*resources*they own ( 
Marcelia and Purnomo 2016) . 
In Indonesia, intellectual capital 
developed*after*emergence of 
“Financial Accounting Standard 
Statement (PSAK) No. 19 (revision 
2010) “concerning intangible asse, 
intellectual *capital*also a process of 
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providing true information that 
concerns about the presentation at 
the company's annual report”. One 
who fall into the category of 
knowledge-based indusrti ( 
knowlegde based industry ) is the 
industry of banking. 
The disclosure of intellectual 
capital featured in news sites online 
in December 2012 about PT. Bank 
Panin, Tbk was demanded to pay 
severance pay to two employees of 
Bank Panin who were laid off. The 
same case also happened to Bank 
Rakyat Indonesia (Persero) Tbk in 
March 2013, which was demanded to 
settle its obligations to retirees, 
namely severance pay, tenure 
awards, and compensation money. 
This case indicates that there is a lack 
of comprehensive disclosure of 
information regarding company 
activities and operations. 
Company size is one the factors 
that affect*intellectual 
*capital*disclosure*. This is 
indicated by the size of a company on 
*total* assets, sales, average sales 
and average assets. The bigger the 
company siz,  higher  level of 
intellectual capital disclosure in  
annual report, and the bigger the 
company, the greater the funds for 
the management and maintenance of 
intellectual capital so that it 
continues to be optimal and the 
intellectual capital performance is 
higher, Ashari, PMS, and Putra ( 
2016) . 
The next factor that affects 
intellectual capital disclosure is 
systematic risk that cannot be 
diversified. Systematic risk has the 
potential to increase or decrease the 
company's performance and share 
price, because systematic risk is 
uncontrolable. In addition, there are 
other actors who can influence 
intellectual capital disclosure, 
namely independent commissioners. 
An independent commiioner is a 
member of the board of 
commissioners who is not affiliated 
with the board of directors, other 
membrs of the board of 
commissioners and controlling 
shareholder, and is free from 
business or other relationships that 
may affect his or her ability to act 
indepndently or act solely for the 
benefit independent commissioner 
company “(Law No. 40 of 2007 
concerning Limited Liability 
Companies)”. 
An independent commissionr an 
independent and neutral party in the 
company, which is expected to 
bridge the infrmation asymmtry that 
occurs between the owner and the 
manager. “If the *supervision* has 
*carried* out effectively, then the 
management of the company will be 
carried out properly, and 
management will disclose all 
available information, including 
information about intellectual capital 
, White (2007)”. 
White research (2007) “concluded 
that an independent commissioner 
influential the 
*intellectual*capital*disclosure*” . 
This is in line with the basic theory, 
because the existence of independent 
commissioners supports the principle 
of responsibility to disclose 
intellectual capital in implementing 
corporate governance , which 
requires responsibility to 
stakeholders . Nughroho (2017) 
“states that independent 
commissioners have no effect on 
intellectual capital disclosure 
because the roles and functions of the 
independent commissioners are not 
optimal”. Where the existence of 
independent commissioners who 
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should support the responsibility to 
disclose intellectual capital and the 
implementation of corporate 
governance , has even caused 
disruption of functions and duties. It 
is also possible for a company to 
have high management ownership so 
that it will focus more on the interests 
of the owners rather than optimizing 
disclosure of intellectual capital. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 *Agency*Theory* 
Agency*theory aims to improve 
ability individuals (both principals 
and agents) in evaluating the 
company environment where a 
decision must be made ( The Belief 
Revision role ), in addition, financial 
theory also aims to evaluation results 
decisions that have been taken to 
facilitate the allcation of results 
between principals and agents. in 
accordanc with the agrement in the 
work contract “( The Performance 
Evaluation role )”. Agency theory 
asserts that disclosure can reduce 
agency costs in the relationship 
between shareholders as providers of 
funds and management as 
operational decision makers, Jensen 
and Meckling (1976). The agency 
costs arise due to agency conflicts 
caused by differences in the 
management function (manager) and 
the company's ownership and control 
functions (the principal) which 
results in moral hazard , Jensen and 
Meckling (1976).  
2.2 Signal Theory 
Signaling theory is basically 
concerned with the decrease in 
information asymmetry between the 
two parties, Spence (2002). 
Signaling theory is also concerned 
with dealing with problems arising 
from information asymmetry in 
social settings. This shows that 
information asymmetry can be 
reduced if those who have the 
information can send signals to 
related parties. A signal can be an 
observable action, or an observable 
structure, which is used to show the 
hidden characteristics (or qualities) 
of the signaler . Signal delivery is 
usually based on the assumption that 
it should be profitable for the signaler 
(for example showing a higher 
quality of the product compared to its 
competitors), An (2011). 
2.3 Intellectual Capital 
Disclosure 
Intellectual capital referring to the 
capitals of non-physical or intangible 
capital ( intangible assets) or 
invisible ( invisible ) associated with 
knowledge and human experience 
and the technology used. There are 3 
main elements of intellectual capital 
according to Sawarjuwono (2003) in 
Istanti (2009), namely Human 
Capital (human capital) , Structural 
Capital or Organizational Capital 
(organizational capital) , Relational 
Capital or Customer Capital 
(customer capital). 
2.4 *Company Size* 
“Company*size* describes  size a 
company as measurd by the total 
assets owned by the company”, 
Sujoko and Soebiantoro in Pusanti 
(2013). Total assets are a relatively 
more stable measure compared to 
other company measuremnts, 
Muksodah, Oemar, Andini, (2015).  
2.5 Systematic Risk 
Systematic risk or market risk is a 
risk that is always there and cannot 
be eliminated by diversifying 
because it will affect all operating 
companies. Systematic risk is related 
to macro factors that occur outside 
the operating company. These 
factors are economic growth, deposit 
interest rates, inflation rates, foreign 
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exchange rates, government policies 
in the economic sector and others. 
2.6*Independent*Commissioner* 
Independent commissioner is a 
membr board of commissionrs who 
is not affiliation with the board of 
directors, other members of the board 
of commissioners and control 
shareholder, and free business 
relationships and other rlationships 
that may affect his ability to act 
independently , the independent 
board of commissionrs is to ensure 
that the company's trials run well 
participate in decision making and 
ensure that management decisions 
are in line with the interests of the 
owners, so the presence of 
independent commissioners can 
affect the level of broader skill 
disclosure, Hanniffa (2005). 
2.7*Research*Hypothesis* 
Theoretical basis that analyzes 
effct of company size, systematic 
risk and independent commissioners 
on intellectual capital disclosure , the 
hypothesis can be explained as 
follows: 
2.7.1*The*Effect*of*Company*Si
ze Intellectual Capital*Disclosure 
*Company*size describs size a 
company as measured by knowing 
the total assets owned by the 
company. And the higher the demand 
for information disclosure compared 
to smaller companies.  
H1 : *Company*size*has a positive 
effect on Intellctual Capital 
Disclosre. 
2.7.2 The*Effect* Systematic* 
Risk on *Intelectual*Capital 
Disclosre 
By informing the market and 
shareholders of intellectual capital in 
the company, management hopes to 
reduce the risk associated with the 
company by reducing uncertainty 
about “ hidden value” and its 
potential.  
H2 : Systematic risk has a positive 
effect on Intelectual Capitl 
Disclosure. 
2.7.3   Effect of Independent 
Commissioners on Intellectual 
Capital Disclosure 
If the supervision has been carried 
out effectively, then the management 
of the company will be carried out 
properly, and management will 
disclose all available information, 
including information about 
intellectual capital , White (2007). 
H3 : Independent Commissioner has 
a positif effct Intellectual Capital 
Disclosre. 
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
3.1  Data Collection Techniques 
This research uses a quantitative 
approach. According to Sugiono 
(2017: 8) “quantitative research 
methods can be interpretedas 
research methods based on the 
philosophy of positivism, used to 
research on certain sample 
populations, data collection using 
research instruments, data analysis is 
quantitative / statistical, with the aim 
of testing predetermind hypoteses”.  
3.2 Operational Definitions of 
Variabels 
The dependent variabel is 
intellectual capital disclosure and the 
independent variables are company 
size, systematic risk and independent 
commissioners.  
3.3 Sample Collection Techniques 
The population taken was all 
banking companies for the 2015-
2018 period with 35 companies, th 
criteria were: 
 
1. Banking sub-sector companies 
listed on the ISE during the *2015-
2018* priod. 
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2.  During *2015-2018* period, 
company published complete 
financial reports in rupiah currency. 
3. Have data regarding company 
size, systematic risk, and an 
independent board of commissioners 
during the 2015-2018 observation 
period. 
3.4  Data*Analysis*Techniqes* 
Method in this studi using a nalisis 
panel data regresion which is a 
combinaton of data cross section 
(data several companies) and data 
time series (data collected over one 
year), where the cross section the 
same measured at different times. 
“So in other words, panel data is data 
from several companies (samples) 
that were observed over a certain 





Descriptive analysis use to be able 
to see an overview of the distribution 
of the data to be studied (Eksandy, 
2018: 66). The data distribution can 
be seen through the mean, median, 
max value, min value and standard 




















Table 1. Descriptive Statistical Analysis 
 
  
Source: processed data, Eviews 9 output 
 
Base on the table abov, the sample 
(N) used 140 data consisting of 35 
companies with an observation 
period of 4 years, namely the 2015-
2018 period. I ntellectual capital 
disclosure ( ICD ) has a minimum 
value of 1.05600, the maximum 
value of 1.500000. The average 
value is 1.331764 and the standard 
deviation is 0.109929 . D ari results 
of the average derived from the 
cumulative index score of 
intellectual capital disclosures by 48 
of 63 score . Compny Size has a min 
value of 10.16600 , a max value 
20.98300 with an average value of 
17.52659 and a standard deviation of 
1.824081 . Systmatic Risk (BETA ) 
has a min value of -4.527000 , a max 
value of 13.75100 , an average value 
of 0.809493 and a standard dviation 
 *ICD* SIZE** *BETA* KI* 
 *Mean  1.331764 17.52659 0.809493  0.588929 
 *Media
n  1.361000 17.23800 0.632000  0.600000 
 Maxim
um  1.500000 20.98300 13.75100  0.750000 
 Minimu
m  1.056000 10.16600 -4.527000  0.400000 
 Std. 






0.256228  2.004362  0.034319 
 Kurtosi
s  2.424528 3.544421 15.28025  1.849749 
     
 Jarque-
Bera  10.64639 3.260866 973.4342  7.745436 
 Probabi
lity  0.004877 0.195845 0.000000  0.020802 
     
 Sum  186.4470 2453.723 113.3290  82.45000 
 Sum 
Sq. Dev.  1.679717 462.4910 560.3498  1.188971 
     
 Observ
ations  140  140  140  140 
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of 2.007808 . I ndependent 
Commissionr (KI) has a min value of 
0.400000, the max value of 0.750000 
owned by Bank Victoria 
International Tbk in 2017 and 2018, 
the average value of 0.5888929 and a 
standard deviation of 0.092486.  
Panel Data Regression Estimates 
Model common effect s a panel 
data approach simplest. More about 
the results of the common effect 
model approach as follows: 
 
Table 2. Common Effect Model 
 
“Dependent Variable: ICD” 
“Method: Panel Least Squares” 
“Date: 09/29/19   Time: 14:17“ 
“Sample: 2015 2018“ 
“Periods included: 4“ 
“Cross-sections included: 35“ 
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“Source: processed data, Eviews 9 output“ 
The fixed effects model assumes 
that the differences between 
individuals can be accommodated 
from differences in the intercept. 
Learn more about the results of the 
approach Fixed Effect s Model as 
follows: 
 
Table 3.Fixed Effect Model 
“Dependent Variable: ICD“ 
“Method: Panel Least Squares“ 
“Date: 09/29/19   Time: 14:31“ 
“Sample: 2015 2018“ 
“Periods included: 4“ 
“Cross-sections included: 35“ 








































     
“Effects Specification“ 
“Cross-section fixed 
(dummy variables) “  
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  Source: processed data, Eviews 9 output“ 
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In this model, panel data estimates 
will be selected where the residuals 
may be interrelated over time and 
between individuals. Learn more 
about the results of the approach 
Random Effect s Model as follows: 
Tabel 4. Random Effect Model 
           
Source: processed data, Eviews 9 output 
Model Selection Model Estimation 
The Chow test is a test to 
determine the Fixed Effect or 
Common Effect model that is more 
appropriate to use in estimating panel 
data.  
 
Table 5. Uji Chow 
   Source: processed data, Eviews 9 output 
Based on Table 4.1.5 above, the 
cross-section probability value F is 
0.0000 <0.05 and the chi-square 
cross section is 0.0000 <0.05. 
Therefore, the regression model is 
better to use the Fixed Effect Model 
than the Common Effect Model. 
 
Table 6. Uji Hausman 
 




“Redundant Fixed Effects Tests“ 
“Equation: EQ01“ 
“Test cross-section fixed effects“ 
“Effects Test“ 
“Statis










19811 34 0.0000 
“Lagrange Multiplier Tests for Random 
Effects“ 
“Null hypotheses: No effects“ 
“Alternative hypotheses: Two-sided 
(Breusch-Pagan) and one-sided“ 
       “ (all others) alternatives“ 











0271  157.8699 
 




“Dependent Variable: ICD“ 
“Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section 
random effects)“ 
“Date: 09/29/19   Time: 14:41“ 
“Sample: 2015 2018“ 
“Periods included: 4“ 
“Cross-sections included: 35“ 
“Total panel (balanced) observations: 
140“ 
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The probability value of random 
cross-section is 0.0718> 0.05. 
Therefore, it is better if the regression 
model uses the Random Effect 
Model than the Fixed Effects Model. 
The cross-section probability 
value of Breusch-pagan is 0.0000 
<0.05. Therefore, it is better if the 
regression model uses the Random 
Effect Model than the Common 
Effects Model. 
The Adjusted R- Squared value of 
0.292287 shows that 29.22% of the 
independent variables in this study 
can explain Intellectual Capital 
Disclosure , while the remaining 
70.78% is explained by other factors 
not examined in this study. This 
means that the level of the 
relationship between the variables of 
Company Size, Systematic Risk and 
Independent Commissioners on 
Intellectual Capital Disclosure is low 
/ weak. 
Based on the results shown in the 
table above shows that the value of 
the F-statistic of 20.13578 , while the 
value of the F-table with a 
probability level of 0.05, df (k-1) = 3 
and df 2 (nk) = 136 of 2.67. Thus the 
F- statistic value is 20.13578 > 2.61 
F-table value and Prob (F- statistic ) 
value is 0.000000 <0.05, so it can be 
said that Company Size, Systematic 
Risk and Independent Commissioner 
jointly influence Intellectual Capital. 
Disclosure. 
The results of the t table are 
calculated with the level of α = 5% , 




5.  CONCLUSION 
1. Based on the results of the t- 
statistic test obtained with a positive 
value of ( 4.201048)> t Table ( 
1.97756 ) and the value of Prob. 
(0.0000) <0.05 indicates that firm 
size (X 1 ) has a significant positive 
effect on Intelletual Capital 
Disclosure (Y), meaning that if firm 
size increases, intellectual capital 
disclosure will increase. 
2. Based on the results of the t- 
statistic test obtained with a positive 
value of (6.098774) > t Table ( 
1.97756 ) and the Prob value . 
(0.0000) <0.05 indicates that 
Systematic Risk (X 2 ) has a 
significant positive effect on 
Intellectual Capital Disclosure (Y), 
which means that if Systematic Risk 
increases, Intellectual Capital 
Disclosure will increase. 
3. Based on the results of the t- 
statistic test obtained with a negative 
value of (- 1.288254) <t Table 
(1.97756) and the Prob value . ( 
0.1998) > 0.05 indicates that the 
Independent Commissioner (X 3 ) 
does not have a significant negative 
effect on Intellectual Capital 
Disclosure (Y), which means that the 
rise and fall of Independent 
Commissioners does not have a 
significant effect on the rise and fall 
of Intellectual Capital Disclosure . 
This indicates that the number of 
independent commissioners does not 
affect the company in disclosing its 
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